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ABSTRACT 
The CEO of a large listed firm is often under public scrutiny due to listing requirements of stock 
exchanges of the respective country as well as pressures from stakeholders. Of these stakeholders, 
shareholders are mostly interested in the firm performance as it relates to their investment to 
determine if their investment is still worthwhile as well as to determine its returns. A CEO has the 
duty of ensuring that a firm meets its set targets and the responsibility of having to account for any 
deviations from these targets. In a firm with sound corporate governance measures, any 
underperformance experienced by the firm should result in the CEO being replaced and when targets 
met, the CEO being rewarded. However this is not always the case and this study considers the key 
determinants of CEO turnover as it later aims to determine what these key determinants are in South 
African JSE-listed firms as well as the correlation with CEO turnover. This study examines the 
relationship between ownership structure and board characteristics on CEO-firm performance 
sensitivity. 
 
The population for this study was 60 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The 
period covered for this study runs over 5 years from 2013 to 2017. This period was chosen mainly 
because data for some companies was missing for the period beyond 2017. Thus, excluding 
companies that had no data for the period beyond 2017 could have reduced the sample further and 
would have made the analysis less meaningful.  
 
The study reports three important findings. The first is that CEO turnover is insensitive to firm 
performance, irrespective of whether it is an accounting-based firm performance (i.e CEO turnover 
vs EBIT/Assets ratio) or market-based measure of firm performance (lagged stock returns, 18, 24, 
and 36 months respectively). Second, the findings of this study show that CEO age and institutional 
ownership are inversely related to CEO turnover. In addition, board size becomes a significant 
determinant of CEO turnover when the model in includes returns lagged over 36 months or when the 
EBIT/Assets ratio is part of the Model (see models 7 and 8), although this is only at 10% level of 
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1 Introduction  
 
The CEO of a large listed firm is often under public scrutiny due to listing requirements of stock 
exchanges of the respective country as well as pressure from stakeholders. Of these stakeholders, 
shareholders are mostly interested in the firm performance as it relates to their investment to 
determine if their investment is still worthwhile as well as to determine its returns. A CEO has the 
duty of ensuring that a firm meets its set targets and the responsibility of having to account for any 
deviations from these targets (Coates & Kraakman, 2010). However, there are factors that may 
influence the CEO not meeting these targets, hence leading to underperformance. These factors 
include CEO duality, CEO tenure as well as CEO age.  
 
In contrast, there are also other factors that have since formed an ongoing discourse and debate 
regarding their ability to ensure that effective monitoring and control mechanisms are in place to deter 
top management from pursuing self-interests. The discourse around these factors was a result of a 
surge in high-profile scandals and other disasters that took place across the globe in the last two 
decades (Mitra, 2019). The surge in these scourges was a result of deficiency in sound governance. 
The belief is that, the success of any firm is posited to be firmly rooted to sound corporate governance. 
Sound governance mechanisms include both internal mechanisms such as board of directors, and its 
structures (i.e. committees), and ownership structures and external mechanisms such as hostile 
takeover bids, legal protection of minority shareholders and disciplining managers in the external 
labour market (Mitra, 2019). The focus of this study is mainly on the internal mechanisms as measures 
for mitigating governance problems. 
 
Owing to the above, the hypothesised view is that, in a firm where there is sound corporate 
governance measures, any underperformance experienced by the firm should result in the CEO being 
replaced, while in a situation where set targets are met, the CEO  is rewarded (Parrino, 1997; Nguyen, 
2011; Warner et al, 1988, Wilkes, 2004). Several studies, many of which were conducted in 
developed countries (see for example, Mitra, 2019, Kao et al, 2019) have shown that board structures 
mechanisms (see for instance, Kao et al, 2019; Drakos and Bekiris, 2010; Guest, 2009; Chao and 
Kim, 2007) and ownership structures (see for example Kao et al, 2019, Bonilla, 2010, Andres, 2008; 
Maury, 2006) are key determinants of firm value. As such, the present study aims to examine the 
impact of ownership structures and governance structures on CEO-turnover performance sensitivity 




1.1 Research Background 
CEOs, as agents of shareholders, play a pivotal role in establishing company policy and strategy and 
are arguably considered by shareholders as the most noticeable or visible persons in the company. 
CEOs (who are agents of shareholders), are responsible for running firms on behalf of shareholders 
(who are the principals). However, despite that CEOs are employed by shareholders to represent their 
interests, CEOs might abuse their power, shirk their jobs, reward themselves with benefits and be 
involved in self-dealing and other entrenchment strategies (Nguyen, 2011) at the expense of 
shareholders. Thus, if a situation exists, where executives act on their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders, then the agency problem is said to exist. Because of the possibility of the Principal-
agent problem, shareholders appoint a board of directors to monitor and control top management in 
order to protect the value of their investment in the firm. Since control of top executives is aimed at 
reducing the abuse of power by executives, the board of directors is pivotal “in such a control 
incentive trade off” (Nguyen, 2011, p.53). Through its monitoring and control roles, the board of 
directors is able to make decisions on the level of managerial control and managerial incentives 
(Nguyen, 2011). Furthermore, the board of directors make important decisions regarding the hiring 
and firing of top executives (Nguyen, 2011). The board of directors monitors the performance of top 
management in terms of their ability to create value for shareholders. Through its monitoring 
mechanisms, the board of directors has the power to fire top management if shareholder value is being 
destroyed. The board of directors monitors the ability of the top executives to maximise shareholder 
value through an observation of the performance of the firm. Thus, after its evaluation of the firm 
performance, the board of directors has the power to fire top executives if they perceive that the ability 
or performance of their executive managers is below the average ability or performance of other 
potential managers in the labour market. Therefore, the threat of dismissal acts as an implicit incentive 
to motivate top executives to put their best effort in pursuit of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Owing to the board’s ability to hire and replace top executives, an understanding of the determinants 
of top executive changes is crucial in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Nguyen, 2011). 
 
However, effective governance depends on or is influenced by many factors including board size and 
composition, particularly its independence (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002), 
capital structure, stock ownership of board members and CEO duality (Brickley et al, 1997). 
Furthermore, other disciplinary mechanisms apart from the board structures could also act as control 
mechanisms for CEO power. For example, the power of the CEOs could be disciplined through 
monitoring by large blockholders or potential competition among managers (Warner et al., 1988).  
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Arguments in prior studies suggest that changes made by the board to top management are also critical 
to firm performance. For example, Volpin (2002) and Gibson (2003) suggested that good corporate 
governance may be reflected by the higher sensitivity between CEO turnover and firm performance. 
Consistent with the above, extant studies that examined the relationship between stock return 
performance and CEO turnover found that poor prior stock return performance is associated with the 
increase in CEO turnover (see for example, Weisbach 1988; Bonnier and Bruner 1989; Furtado and 
Rozeff 1987). The conclusion from these studies was that boards react to protect shareholder wealth.  
 
Although, the relationship of CEO turnover with firm performance has gained more attention, most 
of the evidence in prior studies is based on developed and industrialised markets, such as the U.K. 
(Conyon and Florou, 2002), Germany (Kaplan, 1994), the U.S. (Huson et a1.,2001), and Japan 
(Kaplan, 1994) while scant research has been conducted from the developing countries perspective 
(Mitra, 2019), particularly in Africa (Abosede and Kajola, 2011). 
 
1.2 Rationale for the study 
An extensive amount of studies on CEO turnover have shown that there are many factors which could 
influence the decision to dismiss the CEO. Some of the factors considered in prior studies are 
ownership structure, board composition, and CEO characteristics. Hypothetically, firm performance 
is posited as the main factor that leads to the decision to dismiss the CEO (Boone eta1., 2007; Linck 
et al., 2008). This is based on the notion that poor firm performance or results increases the likelihood 
that the CEO would be dismissed. 
 
As alluded to above, there are also arguments in prior studies that associate firm performance and 
CEO turnover through the effects of other factors such as board composition (see for example, Wijaya 
et al, 2020; Kao et al, 2019; Aluchna and Kaminski, 2017; Abdallah and Ismail, 2017; Battaglia and 
Gallo, 2017, Ducassy and Guyot, 2017; Darko et al, 2016), ownership structures (see for instance, 
Wijaya et al, 2020; Mitra, 2019; Kao, et al, 2019; Wei, 2007; Abdallah and Ismail, 2017; Battaglia 
and Gallo, 2017, Ducassy and Guyot, 2017; Shahveisi et al, 2017; Darko et al, 2016) and CEO 
characteristics (see for example, Lam et al, 2013; Yim, 2013; Peterson et al, 2012; Buyl et al, 2011; 
Brick et al, 2006; Roth, 1995).  
 
Given the scarcity of research based on developing countries in Africa as indicated by Abosede and 
Kajola (2011), this study uses South Africa as the ideal location for the study. The reasons for 
selecting South Africa as a suitable location for this current study are manifold. First, South Africa is 
an emerging economy that has sound governance, and sophisticated financial markets whose 
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characteristics are similar to those of the developed world. Second, South Africa has a sound legal 
and regulatory framework which is also well developed and independent of the state apparatus. Thus, 
the enforcement of rules and regulations is sound, and so is the governance of companies. Third, 
several governance reforms have taken place since the democratic elections held in 1994. Owing to 
the above, there are greater chances that in South Africa that the CEOs could be held accountable for 
their actions or get fired for abuse of power or if they perform poorly. As a result, an examination of 
CEO turnover determinants and the association between performance and CEO turnover is critical in 
understanding the soundness of corporate governance mechanism and practise in South Africa. 
Fourthly, this study could provide some insights into the determinants of CEO turnover from a 
developing country perspective.  
 
Fifth, the most recent scandals in South Africa, which include firms such as Naspers, KPMG, 
McKinsey and SAP as well as the scandal at Steinhoff, EOH, Tongaat-Hulett and Old Mutual to name 
just a few, provide a litmus test of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in South Africa. 
Therefore, studying CEO turnover which is the result of corporate governance practices could provide 
insights into how South Africa could improve its corporate governance systems. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
The main objective of this study is: 
 
• To examine the impact of ownership structure, board composition and CEO characteristics 
on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
• Does ownership structure, board composition and CEO characteristics have an impact on 




1.5 Contribution to the existing body of Knowledge 
The contributions of this current study are manifold. First, this study provides further evidence on the 
determinants of CEO turnover from a developing country perspective and on whether board 
mechanisms are effective in ousting CEOs who are performing poorly. Second, this study provides 
an update on prior findings on the effectiveness of institutional investors in strengthening governance 
systems in a developing country perspective. Third, this study also provides an update on the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms in South Africa following continuous governance reforms 
in South Africa as its sample examines a period between two governance reforms in South Africa, 
that is, after the implementation of King III (2009) and King IV (2016). Fourth, there has been a 
myriad of corporate scandals in South Africa in the recent past, thus an examination of the 
effectiveness of ownership structure, governance structures and CEO characteristics on performance-
turnover sensitivity is critical as this provides some insights into the effectiveness of the impact of 
determinants discussed above in replacing underperforming or scandalous top executives. Fifth, the 
findings of this study may also influence decisions by policy makers and other governance bodies 
through an identification of key factors or determinants that could be critical to discharging effective 
governance from a developing country perspective. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related prior studies, 
while section 3 presents a discussion of the methodology adopted for this study. Section 4 discusses 
the findings of this study, after which section 5 provides a conclusion and recommendation for future 
research in this field. 
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2. Literature Review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Prior period performance and CEO turnover 
 
A Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) forms part of the management of a firm and is tasked with the 
duty of meeting performance measures set by firms and to act in the interests of shareholders as well 
as maximising shareholder value (Nguyen, 2011). Therefore, firm performance is an important 
measure of CEO competence in a firm. Assuming an effective corporate governance structure, if a 
firm performs poorly, it is expected that the CEO will be replaced. If the firm performs well, the CEO 
is rewarded. International literature indicates a negative correlation between firm prior performance 
and CEO turnover. Using a sample of CEOs listed in the Forbes annual compensation, for the period 
1971-1995 and who have held their position for one year or less at public firms in the USA, Huson, 
Malatesta & Parrino (2004) find that firm performance deteriorates prior to a CEO turnover event. 
The results of this study give the consensus that prior deteriorating firm performance triggers 
management turnover and that boards of directors tend to punish poor performance by replacing 
CEOs. Other similar studies, for example, a by Parrino (1997), Warner et al (1988) and more recently, 
Nguyen (2011) found that a CEO is more likely to be replaced for poor prior performance in a firm 
with an effective corporate governance structure.  
 
In a study conducted in South African context, Wilkes (2014) found that there exists a strong negative 
correlation between corporate performance and CEO turnover as it is believed that the CEO is held 
primarily responsible for the performance of a firm. Wilkes (2014)’s study covered the period 
between 1 April 2007 and 31 May 2012, based on a sample of 143 CEO turnover events. The study 
used the pre event and post event corporate performance of the old and newly installed CEO 
respectively in JSE-listed firms. The results in Wilkes (2014) show that that poor corporate 
performance is a major driver of CEO turnover due to 58% of corporations undergoing CEO turnover 
due to underperforming their peers, one year prior to the turnover event.  
 
2.2 The role of a board of directors 
The agency theory of corporate governance states that the role of a board of directors of a firm is to 
monitor management on behalf of the shareholders of the firm (Fama & Jensen 1983). Therefore, the 
assumption under this theory is that the interests of directors should be aligned with those of 
shareholders. The interests of shareholders within the firm include the monitoring of the overall 
performance of that firm to ensure that shares invested in the firm will still provide them with returns 
financially. A well-run firm is one that has its operations closely monitored and has measures in place, 
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in the event of poor performance to ensure the goal remains the interests of shareholders. To ensure 
that this objective is met, corporate governance within a firm is used as an effective measure of 
internal control. Boards of directors of a firm carry the duty of monitoring firm performance and 
replacing managers of poorly performing firms. In a South African context, the King IV (2016) on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, states that the board of directors should “formally evaluate 
the performance of the CEO against agreed performance measures and targets at least annually”. 
Thus, for firms that have a board of directors who are performing their duties as expected, the internal 
monitoring controls are effective in determining if the firm is meeting its performance targets. In an 
effective corporate governance structure, if a firm performs poorly, the CEO will be replaced and if 
a firm performs well, the CEO is rewarded (Nguyen, 2011).  
 
2.2.1 Board characteristics and CEO turnover 
 
There are various factors that key to the effectiveness of the corporate governance structure of a firm. 
These factors include board characteristics such as the independence of directors, board size, CEO 
duality and CEO tenure. These characteristics are discussed in detail in the ensuing sub section.  
 
2.2.1.1 Board size and CEO turnover 
Board size considers the number of directors that sit on a board. There are conflicting views on the 
impact of a board size on CEO turnover. Larger boards may be found to result in a loss of productivity 
as it becomes harder to co-ordinate its members (Huson et al, 2001; Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 1993). 
Jensen (1993) also found that keeping small boards of less than eight directors helps improve the 
performance of a firm. Similarly, Yermack (1996) concludes that there exists an inverse relationship 
between firm value and board size. Larger boards result in poor communication and decision-making, 
which overwhelms the overall effectiveness of these boards, in a sample of the 500 largest public 
firms in the USA during the period 1984 to 1991. More recently, Nguyen (2011) and Nakano & 
Nguyen (2013) also find that boards with fewer directors are more efficient than those with more.  
Uadiale (2010) states that there is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance 
and therefore a larger board size should be encouraged. A larger board is also thought to bring about 
diversity, however there is often a trade-off between diversity and effectiveness of a large board. 
Similarly, Johl et al (2015) conclude that a positive relationship exists between board size and firm 
performance for a sample of 700 publicly listed firms in Malaysia for the year ended 2009. Fauzia & 
Locke (2012) also conclude on a positive relationship between board size and firm performance on a 
sample of 79 New Zealand listed firms for the period 2007 to 2011. 
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The Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”) is compulsory for all South African 
companies that meet the definition of a Public Interest Entity. JSE-listed companies are Public Interest 
Entities and thus this is compulsory legislation.  The Companies Act requires a minimum of three 
directors to sit on a board and King IV requires that the CEO and at least one other executive sit on a 
board. This implies that a minimum of three directors on a board is effective in performing its duties.  
Wilkes (2014) finds that larger boards have stronger governance procedures, which means that the 
more likely it is for these boards to replace CEOs for poor corporate performance in JSE-listed firms. 
The South African stock market also seems to value having larger boards due to their ability to access 
critical resources for a firm (Tshipa & Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 2015). 
 
2.2.1.2 Board independence and CEO turnover 
Board independence considers the proportion of members who are independent, non-executive 
directors within the board (King IV, 2016). An executive director is involved in the day to day 
operations of a firm, including the hiring and firing of management. Management in a firm also 
includes the CEO who is part of top management. Therefore an independent, non-executive director 
can bring an unbiased and objective viewpoint to the firm, without much prior knowledge or expertise 
about the firm. The effective monitoring of a CEO by the board of directors has been brought into 
question as it relates to board independence. Several research studies have been conducted looking 
into the relationship between CEO turnover and board independence.  
 
A consensus exists that the more independent the board of directors are, the more likely it is for the 
board to replace a CEO for poor performance, as is discussed below. Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) 
question the effective monitoring of a CEO by the board of directors if executive directors sitting on 
the board, would have been part of the election process of the CEO in question. Similarly, Nguyen 
(2011) has shown that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely to replace CEOs 
for poor performance and replace the CEO with an outsider. However, boards are not fully 
independent given that executive directors also are chosen by the CEO in most instances and not 
shareholders. Thus, it was found that the more independent a board is, the more willing it will be to 
effectively monitor the performance of the CEO and thus replace them for poor performance (Huson, 
Malatesta & Parrino, 2004; Huson et al, 2001; Yermack, 1996).   
 
It has also been concluded that these boards of directors are most effective in monitoring the 
performance of the CEO if they are independent non-executives as they are able to give unbiased 
criticism (Jensen 1993). Fama & Jensen (1993) also argue that independent non- executive directors 
tend to be more effective monitors of management than executive directors because they are generally 
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key decision makers at other firms who are more concerned about their reputations in the managerial-
labour market. Board independence therefore is effective in disciplining management in poor 
performing firms (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008).  
 
Laux (2008), using a model that looks into board independence and CEO turnover, finds that the more 
independent a board is, the more likely it is for a CEO to be replaced and the more generous the 
severance packages and the larger the stock option grants. It is assumed that the longer a CEO stays 
in a firm, the more knowledge and expertise they acquire about the firm. In the event of prior poor 
performance, the board of directors would need to know about what has been happening in the firm, 
from the CEO. Boards with dependent/executive directors have a lower probability of replacing a 
CEO in this event as it is assumed that their incentives are dependent on the performance of the CEO.  
Boards with independent directors are assumed to have interests aligned with those of shareholders 
and so there is a higher probability that a CEO will be replaced in the event of poor prior period 
performance (Laux, 2008).  
 
Therefore, assuming an effective corporate governance structure in a firm, board independence can 
be used as a tool in monitoring firm performance and responding to poor performance by replacing 
the CEO.  Due to the knowledge and expertise gathered by the CEO over the years within the firm, 
there is an expectation from the CEO to be paid out for this information that will be given to directors 
in the event of a CEO turnover (Laux, 2008). Independent boards are more likely to pay out a larger 
sum of a severance benefit and stock option grants to a CEO as they are more likely to replace a CEO 
under these circumstances, whereas dependent board members will most likely not pay out a 
severance packages as they have a lower probability of replacing the CEO (Laux, 2008). It also 
appears that CEOs may have their own bargaining power in the event of a possible turnover due to 
poor prior performance.  
 
Johl et al (2015) find that board independence does not affect firm performance. Bhagat & Bolton 
(2013) find a positive correlation post 2002 between board independence and operating performance 
for a sample of 13 000 US firms. Similarly, Uadiale (2010) finds a positive relationship between 
independent non-executive directors and firm performance for a sample of 30 Nigerian firms listed 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (“NSE”). 
However, there are exceptions to this as seen in the literature by Klein, Shapiro & Young (2005), 
who do not find a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for a sample of 
263 Canadian firms. Particularly, good corporate governance indicators used to measure the 
correlation with firm performance, such as board independence, are more dependent on the ownership 
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structures that are most common in different countries and will thus vary with the country that is 
being observed. In Canada, a negative correlation exists between board independence and firm 
performance for companies that are family-owned, as the presence of an outside director who has 
limited information on the firm as well as no financial stake in the firm, is less effective than the 
presence of an executive director. As a result of this, some scepticism exists amongst investors 
regarding the correlation between corporate governance and firm performance (Bradley, 2004). 
Bhagat & Black (2001) found no correlation between boards with more independent directors and 
firm performance.   
 
Further, in some instances a negative correlation is observed for firms with more independent 
directors and firm performance. Possible reasons for this include the need for executive directors on 
boards for their skills and expertise. Executive directors are thought to know more regarding the firm 
and would thus be able to make better-informed decisions concerning the board, than independent 
directors (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Although independent directors may act or respond to potential 
dilemmas sooner, the decisions made may not be as well informed given that they are not involved 
in the day to day operations of the firm, as are executive directors. However independent directors do 
still serve a purpose in giving and making unbiased opinions and decisions. The optimal outcome 
appears to be for a suitable mix of both executive and independent, non-executive directors on boards 
of firms, who bring a mix of skills and knowledge. Executive directors are also thought to be more 
useful given that they have financial capital linked to the firm, which serves as an incentive to perform 
their duties effectively (Bhagat & Black, 2001).  
 
In South Africa, a sound corporate governance is observed, like that of the UK and is also improving 
(Tshipa & Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 2015). Further, SA was the first sub-Saharan African country to adopt 
a corporate governance code in the form of King in 1994. Most recently, it is compulsory for all JSE-
listed public companies to apply the King IV. According to the King IV, a board must consist of a 
mixture of both non-executive and executive directors, of which the majority must be non-executive. 
Of the non-executive directors, majority must be independent. This suggests that King IV (2016) 
expects firms with more independent directors to perform better financially.  
 
Wilkes (2014) has found that these independent non-executive directors are more likely to remove a 
CEO for poor performance than executive directors are. Ntim (2013) and Meyer & De Wet (2013) 
also find that that the more independent a board of a directors is, the higher the firm’s financial 
performance for a sample of JSE-listed companies, covering the period 2002 to 2007 and 2010 to 
2012 respectively.  
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Owing to the above this study posits that: 
H1a: Board size affects the effectiveness of coordination between board members and decision-
making process. Thus, larger boards tend to be less effective, reducing the CEO turnover-firm 
performance sensitivity 
H1b: CEO turnover performance depends on board independence. Thus, CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity is decreasing with a fraction of non-independent directors. 
 
2.2.2 Ownership structures 
Shareholders, as mentioned above have a financial interest in firms of which they would want to be 
continuously monitored to ensure that their investment in that firm is still beneficial. As per the 
agency theory, directors are employed to act on behalf of shareholders and in their best interests. In 
addition to the board of directors, there exists groups of shareholders that have more of an influence 
on directors than others and these groups of shareholders are able to ensure that their interests are 
met. Jensen (1993) defines active investors as individuals or institutions that can actively participate 
in the decision-making of a firm due to large debt and/or equity positions they hold in that firm. These 
types of investors are vital in the corporate governance system of a firm as they have the financial 
interest as well as independence to critique a firm’s management decisions in an unbiased manner. 
Thus, these groups of shareholders can take corrective measures if needed, earlier on to ensure their 
financial interest is protected. Natural active investors include institutional investors and block 
holders.  
 
An institutional investor is a shareholder that invests on behalf of individuals. This includes financial 
institutions such as banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and money managers 
(Jensen, 1993). A block-holder is an influential shareholder in a firm due to the significant number 
of shares they own in a firm (Investopedia, 2019). Past literature has found varying results in respect 
of the influence these types of shareholders have on directors and CEO turnover. Each of the groups 
of shareholder is discussed separately in the subsequent sub sections. 
 
2.2.2.1 The presence of institutional investors 
The influence of institutional investors on management is unclear. This may indicate either that the 
firm is “well-managed” and as a result, institutional investor would want to invest in the firm, or this 
may indicate that the firm is poorly managed and institutional investors would want to invest, take 
over from current management and make profits. In the latter case, this may indicate that the CEO-
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turnover sensitivity is higher. A greater CEO-turnover sensitivity should be expected in firms with 
big institutional shareholders, only if they are active shareholders (Kaplan & Minton, 1994).  
Hermalin (2005) also observes a positive market trend in the presence of institutional investors. 
Huson, Parrino & Starks (2001) discusses that the presence of institutional investors increases 
activism in governance matters and as such puts pressure on firms to increase board independence 
through the stockholder proxy process.  
 
Institutional investors’ impact on CEO-turnover performance sensitivity, on the other hand, has been 
found to be unclear (Nguyen, 2011). Evidence in prior studies show that the presence of large 
Institutional investors might signal a firm’s good management and financial health, hence, making 
top executives change less likely (Nguyen, 2011). Furthermore, evidence in past studies suggests that 
institutional investors tend to vote with their feet, in which case they are assumed to leave the firm 
rather than have to voice their disagreements (see for example, Parrino et al, 2003). In this vein, the 
findings in prior studies show that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional 
shareholders decrease in the year before a forced CEO turnover.  
 
On the contrary, prior studies also argue that the presence of institutional investors act as a threat 
because of their financial muscle and their reputation for launching proxy contests (Nguyen, 2011). 
In addition, institutional investors are argued to as well engage in private negotiations with firms on 
issues related to governance and that they could engage in shareholder activism based on strategies 
that are consistent with their own governance principles (Nguyen, 2011). Shareholder activism is 
present in South Africa, and thus institutional investors actively participate in important decisions 
made by firms. Thus, based on this viewpoint, institutional investors are assumed to be less likely to 
be subjected to management influence. Because institutional investors are less inclined to 
management, they are likely to oppose management when they cast their vote (Nguyen, 2011).  
 
The other argument in prior studies is that institutional investors are different from any other group 
of shareholders in terms of strategy and objectives. First, institutional investors are in most cases 
passive investors who have strategies that are different to any other forms of ownership, as they tend 
to engage in short term investments and second, institutional investors’ objective could be more 
financial than otherwise (see Nguyen, 2011). In addition, arguments by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
show that institutional investors have strong incentives to mitigate executive management’s 
opportunism tendencies and control executive managers’ exploitation of investors. Consistent with 
the argument above, Choi et al (2007) opined that institutional investors could assist independent 
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none executive directors in their monitoring role, hence, in the process contributing to the firm’s 
performance. 
 
In addition to the above, numerous other studies found a positive and significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance (see for example, Mitra, 2019; Kao et al, 2019; Lin and 
Fu, 2017; Piesse et al, 2007; Choi et al, 2007, Omran et al, 2008, Young et al, 2008). However, 
Nguyen (2011) finds that the presence of institutional investors has no impact on sensitivity for a 
sample of the largest French-listed firms for the period 1994-2001. 
 
2.2.2.2 The presence of blockholders 
Boards of directors and blockholders are important internal control mechanisms in a firm, whereas 
the takeover market is a major source of external control (Huson, Parrino & Starks, 2001). 
Blockholders tend to exert more control over management to improve firm performance since their 
stake is big enough to offset the costs of control. Grossman & Hart (1980) state that smaller 
shareholders tend to free ride on the efforts of larger shareholders. In publically held firms, 
management tend to have more influence as there are no large shareholders that have incentives to 
monitor the performance of the firm (Shleifer & Vishny 1986). Therefore, blockholders can serve as 
an effective tool in monitoring firm performance. Laux (2008) also concludes that directors with 
substantial stock ownership, such as blockholders are quick to replace a CEO of a firm in the event 
of poor firm performance.  
 
Large shareholders in firms of 51% share ownership and upwards have outright control in their firms 
and are also incentivised to monitor the management of the firm due to their personal financial interest 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As a result, it can be concluded that large shareholders play a vital role in 
the corporate governance of a firm. However, when government is the large shareholder, there is the 
risk that the interests of these shareholders, do not necessarily align with those of the firm as they 
could be politically influenced. As a result, these shareholders would not be considered as an effective 
monitoring tool for management.  
 
Based on a sample of 119 publicly traded Japanese industrial corporations, Kaplan & Minton (1994) 
report that the existence of large shareholders increases the probability of top management being 
replaced when the firm performs poorly. Furthermore, outside directors as well as large shareholders 
play a role in the monitoring of governance in a firm. Top executive turnover is also found to be 
related to firm earnings and stock performance, particularly low earnings. Blockholders exert their 
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control on management if their incentive is large enough and will thus have an impact on CEO-
turnover sensitivity.  
 
However, based on a sample of French large firms, Nguyen (2011) found that the presence of 
blockholders reduced the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity significantly. In conclusion, Nguyen 
(2011) opined that blockholders are less likely to fire CEOs for poor performance. 
 
2.2.2.3 The presence of both institutional investors and blockholders 
Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards of directors are more likely to include active investors as 
monitors of the firm’s performance. Ownership structures within a firm have an influence on board 
decisions, as large shareholders such as institutional shareholders and blockholders can put pressure 
on management in making decisions (Huson, 2004).  
 
Contrary to the above, Nguyen (2011) found that the co-existence of both blockholders and 
institutional investors does not yield to a significant correlation with CEO turnover sensitivity. CEOs 
are also less likely to be fired for poor performance in firms in which the government holds a stake.  
McConnell & Servaes (1990) instead find a strong positive relation between institutional investors 
and Tobin’s Q but none for blockholders. Therefore, this implies that a positive relation between 
corporate value and institutional share ownerships. Thus, the value of the firm increases first and then 
declines as insider ownership increases.  
 
In a South African context, shareholder activism is still growing and thus literature in this field is 
limited. Institutional investors have been observed to continuously play a growing role in the 
corporate governance monitoring of firms. Organizations such as the Government employees’ 
pension fund (“GEPF”) and the Public Investment Corporation (“PIC”) hold shares in many listed 
companies. The GEPF is Africa’s largest pension fund with more than 1.2 million active members 
(GEPF, 2019). Its main aim is to manage and administer pensions and other benefits for government 
employees in South Africa. The GEPF also invests contributions received by members into various 
asset classes such as equities, properties, bonds and cash/money market instruments (GEPF, 2019).  
The PIC is a fully state-owned asset management firm in South Africa (PIC, 2019). It is also South 
Africa’s largest investment manager and the GEPF represents the PIC’s largest client, accounting for 
89% of the assets managed by PIC. The firm runs a diversified investment portfolio that consists of 
equities, real estate, capital market, private equity and impact investing. As a result of listed 
investments, the PIC controls over 10% of the JSE and has direct and indirect exposures to almost all 
sectors in the South African economy (PIC, 2019). 
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The investment mandate of the PIC is driven by the individual client. As most of the PIC’s clients are 
focused on long-term value maximisation, so is PIC’s mandate when investing into large listed firms. 
Thus, the PIC takes a monitoring role in firms to ensure shareholder value is being preserved (Komati, 
2017).  
 
2.2.2.4 Director share ownership 
Director share ownership looks at the percentage share ownership directors sitting on a board hold. 
This affects board independence as directors become less independent as their share ownership 
increases. There are conflicting views on whether director share ownership acts as an effective tool 
in the monitoring of firm performance and thus replacing CEOs in the event of poor firm performance.  
Morck et al (1988) using Tobin’s Q found a non-monotonic relationship between director share 
ownership and firm value. This implies that firm value first increases and then declines as director 
share ownership increases. Firm value increases when the share ownership increases up to 25% and 
then declines when share ownership increases beyond 25% (Morck et al, 1988).  
 
This evidence in Morck et al (1998) suggests that initially the interests of directors and shareholders 
are aligned when directors own up to 25% of shares in the firm but that firm value is destroyed as 
director ownership increases beyond 25%. Bhagat & Bolton (2008) find that stock ownership by 
board members is positively correlated to subsequent operating performance. Thus, director share 
ownership can be used as a proxy for good corporate governance within a firm. Bhagat & Bolton 
(2013) also find a positive relationship between director ownership and financial performance using 
a sample of 13 000 US firms during the period 1998 to 2007. Similarly, Ntim (2013) finds a positive 
relationship between director share ownership and financial performance for a sample of JSE-listed 
firms in South Africa.  
 
This may imply that the market believes that an increase in director ownership may help align the 
interests of management and shareholders (Tshipa & Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 2015). Owing to data 
constraints for most of the variables, this study focuses on the institutional ownership on CEO 
turnover performance sensitivity only.  
 
Thus, based on to the investment philosophy of institutional owners, this study posits that: 
 




2.2.3 CEO characteristics and CEO turnover-firm performance sensitivity 
2.2.3.1 CEO duality and CEO turnover 
CEO duality refers to the combination of the role of a CEO and Chairman of a firm. Literature on this 
topic finds a correlation between duality and firm performance. Jensen (1993) concludes that the role 
of the CEO and Chairman should be kept separate in order to achieve effectiveness in the performance 
of the firm. Similarly, Bhagat & Bolton (2008) find that firms that separate the roles of a CEO and 
Chairman have a better operating performance than those which do not. Uadiale (2010) and Nguyen 
(2011) found a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, implying that firms 
are more effective when the role of a CEO and Chairman is kept separate. Thus, the consensus is that 
CEO non-duality results in the CEO performing its duties effectively and this would then lessen the 
likelihood of the CEO being replaced by the board as the firm would be performing well.  
 
In South Africa, King IV (2016) requires the Chairman of a firm to be independent and thus the role 
of a CEO and Chairman must be kept separate. Therefore, the effect of CEO duality will not be 
investigated further for JSE-listed firms.  
2.2.3.2 CEO tenure and CEO turnover 
CEO tenure refers to the number of years a CEO is in office. The consensus is that the longer the 
CEO’s tenure is, the less independent the board of directors becomes, which decreases the likelihood 
of the CEO will be replaced due to poor firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). Kaplan & 
Minton (1994) found that CEO turnover is positively correlated to poor prior period performance. In 
addition, the presence of blockholders as well as independent directors on boards increases the 
likelihood of a CEO being replaced.  
 
CEOs are assumed to have private information regarding the company and will thus attempt to 
negotiate for high severance pay-outs in the event of a CEO turnover due to poor performance (Laux, 
2008). Executive directors are less likely to replace the CEO under these circumstances especially if 
their incentives are linked to those of the CEO. Therefore, there is a positive correlation between 
board independence, CEO turnover due to poor performance and severance pay-outs (Laux, 2008). 
However, the exact reason for this correlation is unknown and has been coined as “the unsolved 
puzzle” by Bhagat & Black (2001). The longer a CEO stays in office, the more knowledge and skills 
the CEO acquires giving him/her bargaining power in the event of poor firm performance.  
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A firm with a less independent board is less likely to pay out a large compensation and thus the CEO 
stays employed despite the poor firm performance. Boards with greater activism could however, 
influence board members of a firm to replace the CEO in the event of poor firm performance which 
concurrently leads to greater CEO compensation being paid out.  
 
Greater board diligence results in a greater probability in CEO turnover for poor performance. 
Therefore, shorter CEO tenures on average are expected in firms that have diligent boards of directors 
(Hermalin, 2005). The CEO’s efforts in these firms is greater, to avoid being replaced. Boards which 
are more independent tend to choose more external CEOs than internal. The capabilities of an 
internally chosen CEO are known better than those of an externally chosen CEO. As such, it is 
expected that an external CEO will have a tenure that is shorter than that of an internal CEO 
(Hermalin, 2005).  
 
In the South African context, Wilkes (2004) found that there exists a strong negative correlation 
during the first 4 years of CEO tenure and CEO turnover for a sample of JSE-listed firms, after which 
this correlation becomes weak. This implies that the longer the CEO tenure, the less likely it becomes 
for the CEO to be replaced due to an increase in the power and influence of this CEO within the firm. 
This is especially true in a corporation with weak governance mechanisms.  
 
2.2.3.3 CEO age and CEO turnover 
CEO age is used as control variable to control for differences in the ages of the CEOs. This is in 
recognition of the differences in their risk-taking behaviour between the old and the young CEOs. 
Previous studies model CEO age around risk taking difference between the young and older CEOs. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) for example argue that younger managers are generally associated with 
attempting to be novel, unprecedented, and taking risks.  
 
Conversely, older CEOs are perceived to be at a point in their lives whereby financial and career 
security are more important, have greater commitment to the status quo of the firm, have less physical 
and mental stamina and less able to come up or grasp new ideas or learn new behaviours (Serfling, 
2014) or tend to seek more information to evaluate information in greater depth, hence, leading to 
lengthy decision making. Prior studies generated conflicting findings on the how CEO age impacts 
risk taking behaviour of CEOs. Serfling (2014) for example, found a negative association between 
CEO age and stock return volatility. This finding was consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs’ risk-
taking behaviour decreases as they become older. In addition, Serfling (2014) found that older CEOs 
reduce the firm’s risk through implementation of less risky policies and that: they invest less in 
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research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified 
operations, maintain lower operating leverage. Serfling (2014) further shows that firm risk and the 
riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next influential executive are 
older and higher when both are younger. Overall, Serfling (2014) concluded that CEO age could have 
a significant effect on the risk-taking behaviour and firm performance. Despite the findings by 
Serfling (2014), prior studies on the impact of CEO on risk preferences and risk-taking behaviour 
produced mixed results.  
 
For instance, studies that modelled CEO age around career concerns, predicted that young CEOs 
would be more risk averse because they do not have the reputation similar to the more experienced 
and older CEOs. Similarly, Serfling (2014) argued that since young CEOs would be harshly penalised 
for poor performance, they would be more concerned about their future opportunities and adopt more 
conservative investment policies in order to save their careers. Thus, this implies that younger CEOs 
would shun innovative investments and take investments that are easier for the market to evaluate 
(Zwiebel, 1995). Conversely, there are also studies that developed models that predicted that young 
CEOs invest more aggressively and take greater risk as a signal of greater superiority or talent. For 
example, Yim (2013) found that younger CEOs make more acquisitions because an increase in 
performance linked compensation incentivises them to make more acquisitions early in their career.  
 
Empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between CEO age on CEO turnover (see for 
example, Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993, Weisbach, 1988).  Owing to the above, this study 
hypothesises that: 
 




3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
The data for this study were collected from the Bloomberg terminal that is house in the University of 
Cape Town’s main library. The population for this study was the 158 companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The final sample of 60 companies examined was arrived at by 
excluding all the companies listed under the financial industry, that is banks, insurance and property 
companies as these are governed by a legislation which is different from the companies Act. 
Exclusion of the companies listed on the financial industry is also consistent with prior studies. In 
addition to companies listed under the financial industry, companies with missing data for any of the 
variables for any given year were also excluded. The period covered for this study runs over 5 years 
from 2013 to 2017. This period was chosen mainly because data for some companies was missing 
for the period beyond 2017. Thus, excluding companies that had no data for the period beyond 2017 
could have reduced the sample further, which could have complicated the analysis meant for this 
study.  
 
3.2 Data collection procedure 
Data for all the variables were collected using the Bloomberg terminal that is situated in the main 
library at the University of Cape Town. 
 
3.2.3 Research Models and measurement of Variables 
This study follows the research method that was used by Nguyen (2011). The dependent variable is 
CEO turnover. The independent variables used include two board variables namely: 
• Board size and proportion of non-independent directors or executive directors; 
• One measure of ownership structure, that is institutional ownership; 
• Three lagged measures related to market stock performance, namely 18 months stock returns, 
24 months stock returns and the 36 months stock returns and  
• EBIT/Assets (EBIT-ASSET DUMMY) which is a proxy for prior period accounting 
performance. 
 
The study also uses two control variables, that is, CEO age – to control for differences in risk taking 
based on age differences. The other control variable used is LOG ASSETS, which controls for 
differences in firm sizes. 
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To examine the impact of ownership structure and board structure on CEO turnover sensitivity the 
following 8 models were used: 
 
Model 1 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 18 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 2 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 3 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 36 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 4 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 5 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 18 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 6 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 7 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 36 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Model 8 
CEO Turnover = ∝0+ 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +




• CEO Turnover is the variable that captures if the CEO was replaced in a particular year, 
captured as “1” if replaced, otherwise “0” if not replaced 
• Performance 18 months is the stock return lagged for 18 months 
• Performance 24 months is the stock return lagged for 24 months  
• Performance 36 months is the stock return lagged for 36 months 
• EBIT/ASSETS Dummy is a proxy for accounting performance 
• CEO age represents the age of the CEO 
• TotalINST is the proportion of shareholding by institutional investors 
• BoardSize is the number of directors on the board  
• BoardInsiders is the proportion of executive directors 
• LogAssets is company size measured as a natural logarithm of total assets 
 
4 Data analysis and Research results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and tests for multicollinearity, models’ goodness of fit and model 
specification. 
The study uses Logistic regressions that include CEO turnover as a dependent variable and prior 
performance as the main independent variable. Before performing the regressions, various tests were 
conducted to test for multicollinearity, goodness of fit of each model and a link test is conducted to 
check if the dependent variable was specified correctly. Table 1 represents a correlation matrix for 
the dependent and independent variables. The correlation co-efficients are very low, which suggests 
that the multicollinearity issue is not a problem. In addition to the correlation matrix the VIF tables 
were also generated for the dependent variable and each of the independent variables as further test 
for multicollinearity. The results in Table 2, show that the VIFs for all the independent variables are 
less than 10 and the mean variance is not too different from 1, which suggests that there is no problem 
of multicollinearity. Furthermore, the link test was also conducted to check if the dependent variable 
was specified correctly. The results in Table 3 below show that the hatsq for all the models except 
model 3 is insignificant, which suggests that the dependent variables were specified correctly except 
for model 3.  
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Performance_ 
18month 0,1329 1 
        
 
Performance 
_24month  0,0607 0,9389 1 
       
 
Performance_ 
36month -0,0084 0,7516 0,8338 1 
      
 
EBIT_ASSET~y 0,009 0,2131 0,2652 0,2859 1 
     
 
CEO_AGE -0,209 -0,0963 -0,094 -0,0616 0,037 1 
    
 
TotalINST -0,1539 0,1492 0,161 0,1808 0,0999 0,0452 1 
   
 
BOARD_SIZE 0,0914 0,0613 0,0702 0,1049 -0,0937 0,2291 -0,0531 1 
  
 
Board_Insi~s -0,0993 0,0083 0,0065 0,0153 0,2072 0,2964 0,1504 -0,0218 1 
 
 
Log_Assets 0,0854 -0,1639 -0,1728 -0,1334 -0,1604 0,1136 -0,1009 0,4355 -0,1325 1  
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Table 2 VIF Test for Multicollinearity. 
 
M1 M2 M2 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 




   
1,26 

















   
1,06 
   
1,2 
Board_Insiders 1,13 1,13 1,13 1,13 1,52 1,52 1,52 1,53 
CEO_AGE 1,13 1,13 1,13 1,17 1,32 1,32 1,33 1,31 
Log_Assets 1,07 1,07 1,06 1,06 2,11 2,12 2,06 2,07 
BOARD_SIZE 
    
1,46 1,48 1,49 1,41 
TotalINST  
    
1,14 1,15 1,15 1,13 
Ind2 
    
1,45 1,49 1,68 1,45 
Ind3 
    
1,88 1,93 2,13 1,84 
Ind4 
    
1,28 1,31 1,38 1,22 
Ind5 
    
1,7 1,71 1,75 1,79 
Ind6 
    
1,41 1,42 1,41 1,45 
Ind8 
    
1,43 1,43 1,42 1,4 
         




Table 3 Linktest results 
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
      
M1 _hat 0,9927769 0,8019306 1,24 0,216 
 
_hatsq -0,0027854 0,2892279 -0,01 0,992 
M2 _hat 1,858192 1,107183 1,68 0,093 
 
_hatsq 0,2966549 0,3616504 0,82 0,412 
M3 _hat 3,004258 1,072336 2,8 0,005 
 
_hatsq 0,6513993 0,3214633 2,03 0,043 
M4 _hat 2,401915 1,11218 2,16 0,031 
 
_hatsq 0,4691035 0,3485337 1,35 0,178 
M5 _hat 0,8545626 0,3661805 2,33 0,02 
 
_hatsq -0,0629686 0,1370633 -0,46 0,646 
M6 _hat 0,9702147 0,4602825 2,11 0,035 
 
_hatsq -0,0121375 0,166343 -0,07 0,942 
M7 _hat     
1.28547 
0,5121471 2,51 0,012 0,28168 
 
_hatsq 0,1088594 0,1716428 0,63 0,526 
M8 _hat 1,009864 0,4791267 2,11 0,035 
 
_hatsq 0,0038936 0,168632 0,02 0,982 
 
Furthermore, the goodness of fit of each model was conducted using the Pearson goodness of fit test. 
The results in Table 4 show that, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the model fits 
the data well. 
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Table 4 Logistic model for CEO Turnover, goodness-of-fit test 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Pearson chi2 201,28 206,96 215,74 210,09 202,95 210,13 216,28 211,62 
Prob > chi2 0,4414 0,3346 0,1977 0,2812 0,2633 0,1632 0,1013 0,1461 
 
After conducting the test for the assumptions discussed above, the descriptive analysis of the 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
TWO_TIER_BOARD 252 1 0 1 1 
TotalINST 252 48.64 38.371 1.68 100.00 
CEO_AGE 252 53.62 5.975 37 70 
BOARD_SIZE 252 11.39 2.556 6 20 
Perfomance_18month 252 0.1615 0.5355 -0.867 3.2169 
Perfomance_24month 252 0.2102 0.6456 -0.8941 3.3719 
Perfomance_36month 252 0.4481 0.8895 -0.9115 3.4453 
CEO Turnover 252 0.171 0.377 0 1 
EBIT_ASSETS_Dummy 252 0.929 0.258 0 1 
CEO_Founder 252 1 0 1 1 
Log_Assets 252 9.978 1.154 5.858 13.06 
Board_Insiders 252 24.25% 8.657 7.692% 50% 
 
For the descriptive statistics, only variables of interest are discussed. The descriptive analysis of all 
the other variables are however presented in Table 5. Variables of interest that are briefly discussed 
are CEO age and board size and the proportion of executive directors who are herein coded as board 
insiders.  The results in Table 5 show that the average age for the CEO was 53.62, with a minimum 
age of 37 and maximum of 70, which suggests the youngest CEO was 37 which the oldest had 70 
years. The standard deviation for the CEO age was 5.975%. Board size had an average of 11.9, a 
minimum of 6 and a maximum of 20, which suggests that the smallest board had 6 directors whereas 
the largest had 20 on the board. Board insiders have an average of 24.25%, a minimum of 7.69% and 
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a maximum of 50%, with a standard deviation of 8.86%. This suggests that the minimum proportion 
of executive directors on a board was 7.69% while the maximum representation by executive 
directors was 50%. 
 
4.2 Results of the association between ownership structure and board structure on CEO 
turnover- performance sensitivity (Models 1 -8) 
The results in Table 5 test the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance using 18 months, 24 
months and 36 months lagged stock returns as proxies for stock performance. Consistent with Nguyen 
(2011), this study also uses a dummy for positive variation between year N (year under consideration) 
and N-1 (year prior to the one under consideration) of the EBIT/Assets ratio as a proxy for accounting 
performance. Thus, the Table 5 presents results from Logistic regressions that use CEO turnover as 
a dependent variable and previous performance as the main independent variable. The results in 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 control for the CEO age, proportion of insiders and firm size.  
However, the results for Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that there is an insignificant positive relationship 
between CEO turnover and any of the four measures of performance. In other words, CEO turnover 
is not associated with prior firm performance irrespective of whether it is market based (stock returns) 
or accounting based (accounting based, that is EBIT/Assets ratio). The findings of this study, 
therefore, imply that CEO turnover cannot be traced to the firm’s prior performance. This could be 
because this study did not make a distinction between the reasons for the CEO turnover. Accounting 
for this could have possibly produced different results.  These findings are inconsistent with the 
findings of Nguyen (2011, Huson et al, 2001; Denis and Denis, 1995; Denis et al, 1997) who found 
that CEO turnover is negatively related prior firm performance.  
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4, on the other hand, all show that CEO turnover is negatively impacted by CEO 
age. In other words, the results show that there is a significantly negative relationship between CEO 
turnover and CEO age. Similar to the findings based on prior performance, the Models 1, 2 3, and 4 
show that there is no significant relationship between firm size and CEO turnover. 
Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 include a number of control variables for the firm, CEO characteristics, board 
structure and industry of affiliation. The findings based on Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 show that CEO 
turnover is insignificantly related to all measures of performance, irrespective of whether it is market 
or accounting based measure of performance. These findings is also inconsistent with Nguyen (2011), 
Huson et al (2001), Denis et al (1997) and Denis (1995). However, models 5, 6, 7 and 8, all show that 
CEO turnover is negatively and significantly related to CEO age and proportion of Institutional 
shareholding (that is, TotalINST), albeit at different levels of significance. Models 5, 6 and 7 show 
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that CEO age is negatively related to CEO turnover at 5% while Model 8 shows that CEO age is 
negatively related to CEO turnover at 1% significance level. Models 5, 6 and 8 show that CEO 
turnover is negatively related to the proportion of shareholding of institutional shareholders at 1% 
while CEO turnover is negatively related to shareholding of institutional shareholders at 5%. 
In addition to that, models 7 and 8 show that CEO turnover is positively and significantly related to 
board size at 10%, while Models 5 and 6 show that there is a positive but insignificant relationship 
between CEO turnover and board size. The findings in Model 7 and 8 are inconsistent with the 
findings of Nguyen (2011) who found no relationship between CEO turnover and board size while 
those shown by Models 5 and 7 are consistent with the findings by Nguyen (2011) who also found 
that CEO turnover is not impacted by board size.  Apart from the above, the results in Models 5, 6, 7 
and 8 show that there is no relationship between CEO turnover and firm size and the proportion of 
board insiders. The findings in Models 5, 6 and 7 are consistent with the findings of Nguyen (2011) 
who found no relationship between CEO turnover board insiders and firm size respectively while 
Model 8 is inconsistent with the findings of Nguyen (2011) who found a negative and significant 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm size at 10%. 
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Table 6 Robust Regression Models 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Perfomance_18month 0.486    0.579    
 (1.533)    (1.423)    
Perfomance_24month  0.114    0.115   
  (0.418)    (0.368)   
Perfomance_36month   -0.110    -0.153  
   (-0.545)    (-0.505)  
EBIT_ASSETS_Dummy    0.241    0.395 
    (0.351)    (0.552) 
CEO_AGE -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.0913** -0.0966** -0.103** -0.101*** 
 (-2.712) (-2.744) (-2.778) (-2.881) (-2.423) (-2.493) (-2.555) (-2.635) 
TotalINST     -1.825*** -1.729*** -1.652** -1.723*** 
     (-2.709) (-2.614) (-2.523) (-2.650) 
BOARD_SIZE     0.125 0.144 0.168* 0.155* 
     (1.373) (1.609) (1.852) (1.805) 
Board_Insiders -0.00533 -0.00606 -0.00627 -0.00758 0.00291 0.00312 0.00191 0.00171 
 (-0.208) (-0.240) (-0.250) (-0.298) (0.112) (0.124) (0.0755) (0.0681) 
Log_Assets 0.180 0.156 0.140 0.153 -0.224 -0.281 -0.323 -0.284 
 (1.032) (0.927) (0.842) (0.915) (-0.856) (-1.147) (-1.399) (-1.200) 
Constant 2.360 2.886 3.360 2.871 5.174* 5.746** 6.177** 5.562* 
 (0.853) (1.059) (1.245) (1.076) (1.758) (1.989) (2.188) (1.952) 
         
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Pseudo R2 0.0693 0.0593 0.0599 0.0590 0.144 0.134 0.135 0.134 
LR Chi2 14.95 10.91 8.831 9.017 21.27 19.82 21.12 19.65 
Prob>chi2 0.00481 0.0277 0.0655 0.0607 0.0466 0.0705 0.0487 0.0741 
Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5 Conclusion and recommendations for future studies 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and board characteristics on CEO- 
firm performance sensitivity. The study reports three important findings. The first is that CEO 
turnover is insensitive to firm performance, irrespective of whether it is an accounting-based firm 
performance (i.e CEO turnover vs EBIT/Assets ratio) or market-based measure of firm performance 
(lagged stock returns, 18, 24, and 36 months respectively). Second, the findings of this study show 
that CEO age and institutional ownership are inversely related to CEO turnover. In addition, board 
size becomes a significant determinant of CEO turnover when the model in includes returns lagged 
over 36 months or when the EBIT/Assets ratio is part of the Model (see models 7 and 8), although 
this is only at 10% level of significance. Third, board insiders and firm size are found to be unrelated 
to CEO turnover. In other words, the findings of this study show that board insiders and the size of 
the firm do not impact CEO turnover. Put differently, the results of this study show that there is no 
statistical relationship between CEO turnover and the proportion of executive directors and firm size 
respectively. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for future research 
This study examined the relationship between Ownership structure, board characteristics and firm 
performance on CEO turnover over a 5-year period, thus, a longer time frame could also be 
considered for future studies. In addition, a limited number of ownership, board and CEO 
characteristics were considered for this study, and thus future studies could build from this current 
study by incorporating some of the other variables that could be taken from ownership and board 
structures and CEO characteristics. Other qualitative factors influencing CEO turnover, such as the 
influence a CEO has on the board and management, the CEO’s stake in the company and the role that 
Key performance indicators may play, could also be further researched, above what has already been 
considered in this study. Furthermore, future research in this field could as well incorporate variables 
taken from board committees, especially those committees that could be linked to issues related to 
decisions that affect the CEO for example, Remuneration committee, Nomination committee, Audit 
committee and Risk committee. Other competing measures of performance could be used, for 
example EVA, MVA, ROA and ROE, most importantly EVA and MVA as these are related to value 
creation since the CEO has a mandate to maximise firm value as a whole and not only to shareholders 
as prior. Thus, future studies should consider performance measures that provide a holist measure of 
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